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ABSTRACT 
The background of this research was on policy issues of continuing increased subsidies for 
fertilizer and seed rice from year to year, which was also faced the problem of inefficient 
economic and government budget allocations, the price disparity between input and 
output and its derivatives result and also the creation of unreal competitiveness as a result 
of the use of subsidized inputs. This study aims to determine the “protection coefficient” 
of subsidized inputs (fertilizer and seeds) and output in agriculture rice plants in Indonesia. 
Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM) is used to analyze the impact of subsidies on rice crop farming 
system in Indonesia. The analysis result of the Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM), shows that (1) 
the rice farming system has the profit of market prices and social prices, (2) government 
policies are simultaneously protective to the production capability, (3) It has a competitive 
and a comparative advantage. 
 
Keywords: Subsidies on Fertilizer and Rice Seeds, Protection Coefficient, The Policy 
Analysis Matrix. 
 
ABSTRAK 
Latar belakang dari penelitian ini isu kebijakan peningkatan subsidi pupuk dan benih 
menghadapi masalah alokasi pemerintah dan ketidakefisienannya, perbedaan harga 
antara input dan output dan hasil turunannya dan juga penciptaan daya saing yang tidak 
nyata sebagai akibat dari penggunaan input bersubsidi. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk 
menentukan “koefisien perlindungan” dari input bersubsidi (pupuk dan biji-bijian) dan 
output pada tanaman padi pertanian di Indonesia. Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM) digunakan 
untuk menganalisis dampak subsidi pada sistem pertanian tanaman padi di Indonesia. 
Hasil analisis Matriks Analisis Kebijakan (PAM), menunjukkan bahwa (1) sistem usahatani 
padi memiliki keuntungan harga pasar dan harga sosial, (2) kebijakan pemerintah secara 
simultan melindungi kemampuan produksi, (3) memiliki kompetitif dan keunggulan 
komparatif. 
 
Kata Kunci: Subsidi Pupuk dan Benih Padi, Koefisien Perlindungan, Matriks Analisis 
Kebijakan. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Agricultural input subsidies are a form of rural (traditional) agricultural development policy which is 
generally carried out as price subsidies that can be accessed by all rural farmers, or for all producers in 
certain categories. The fundamental reason for subsidies in agricultural development is focused on 
increasing agricultural productivity with the adoption of new technologies that are more attractive to 
smallholders (Susila, 2010). 
Fertilizer subsidies that are very expensive will create demands on increasing the government 
budget because it will stimulate an increase in fertilizer consumption (Pearce, 2002), which is mostly 
due to inefficiency in its use or because of the limited knowledge of farmers about the benefits of 
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inputs and their correct use, politics is also often the cause of pressure to increase the amount of 
subsidies, or to maintain the turbulence of rising input prices. Input subsidies should be able to help 
farmers implement the benefits of subsidies, and receive subsidies to buy and use inputs for their own 
needs and it must be understood that subsidies cannot be given continuously or to the extent that 
farmers must be able to get out of dependence on subsidies. 
The development of subsidy realization of fertilizer and seed spending in 2010-2015 is presented 
in the table: 
 
Table 1. Realized Budget Allocation for Fertilizer and Seed Subsidies (Billion Rupiah) 
Year 
Fertilize 
Subsidies 
Total 
Subsidies (%) 
Non Energy 
Subsidies 
Seed 
Subsidies 
Total 
Subsidies (%) 
Non Energy 
Subsidies 
2008 15.181,50 5.51% 29.04% 985,20  0.36% 1.88% 
2009 18.329,00 13.27% 42.14% 1.597,20  1.16% 3.67% 
2010 18.410,90 9.55% 34.90% 2.177,50  1.13% 4.13% 
2011 16.344,60 5.53% 41.12% 96,90  0.03% 0.24% 
2012 13.958,50 4.03% 34.95% 60,30  0.02% 0.15% 
2013 17.932,70 5.15% 37.14% 1.454,20  0.42% 3.01% 
2014 21.048,80 6.31% 40.81% 1.564,80  0.47% 3.03% 
2015 35.703,10 16,83% 51,02% 939,40  0,44% 1,34% 
Source: Financial Note of APBN 2015 and RAPBN 2016 
 
The realization of the fertilizer subsidy budget allocation is channeled through fertilizer-
producing state-owned enterprises, showing a fluctuating increase from 2008-2015, with the highest 
subsidy allocation occurring in fertilizer subsidies in 2015 valued at Rp35,70 trillion with a proportion 
of 51,02 percent of the total non-energy subsidies or 16,83 percent of the total subsidy allocation, this 
is the biggest subsidy allocation for the last eight years. In the period 2008-2015, in the seed subsidy 
post, in addition to accommodating price subsidies also included a budget for superior seed direct 
assistance (BLBU) and national seed reserves (CBN). The realization of the seed subsidy budget in that 
period was nominally very volatile with the largest value in 2010 amounting to Rp2,17 trillion. In 2011 
and 2012, budget allocations declined sharply from 2010 because since 2011 seed subsidies only 
accommodated price subsidies. In 2013-2014 sharply increased in the range of Rp1,5 trillion while in 
2015 again decreased to Rp939,4 billion. (NK RAPBN, 2016). This indicates certain strategic 
considerations in the allocation of seed subsidies during the period 2008 to 2015. 
The description of the production capacity and agricultural productivity of rice plants in the 
period 2010 to 2014 can be seen in the table: 
 
Table 2. Production, productivity and rice harvest area in 2010-2014 
Rice Commodity 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Growth (%) 
Production (in 1000 ton)      
Java  36,375.00 34,405.00  36,527.00  37,493.00  36,659.00  0.29% 
Outside Java  30,094.00 31,352.00  32,529.00  33,787.00  34,173.00  3.24% 
Indonesia  66,469.00 65,757.00  69,056.00  71,280.00  70,832.00  1.63% 
Productivity (ku/ha)      
Java  57.21  55.81  59.05  57.98  57.28  0.08% 
Outside Java  43.65  44.54  44.81  45.85  46.22  1.45% 
Indonesia  50.15  49.80  51.36  51.52  51.35  0.60% 
Harvest Area (in 1000 ha)      
Java  6,358.00  6,165.00  6,186.00  6,467.00  6,000.00  0.20% 
Outside Java  6,895.00  7,038.00  7,260.00  7,368.00  7,393.00  1.76% 
Indonesia  13,253.00  13,203.00  13,446.00  13,835.00  13,793.00  1.01% 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Directorate General of Agricultural Infrastructure and Facilities, 2015 
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When comparing Tables 1 and 2, it will be seen that fluctuations in the ups and downs of 
allocation of fertilizer subsidies and seeds are not rooted in national rice production which tends to 
increase steadily from year to year with a national average growth of 1,63 percent per year, even the 
lowest subsidy value in 2012 followed by a fairly high increase in national production (up around 3,3 
million tons), with the highest level of productivity on the island of Java (59,05 ku / ha), where in the 
harvested area was relatively not much changed ( average growth of 0,2 percent per year), because 
the expansion of agricultural land on the island of Java is very limited and even tends to decrease due 
to the conversion of agricultural land to the industrial, trade and housing sectors, so the assumption 
of increased production is due to inappropriate land area factors, thus input subsidies look like they 
have no effect on rice yields during this period. 
From the description, the policy of subsidizing rice fertilizers and seeds is the main concern of 
the allocation of government agricultural input subsidies that continue to increase from year to year, 
which is based on the central issue of food security issues, the problem of traditional agricultural 
patterns with the adoption of low agricultural technology, and sustainable agricultural development 
(Alghoziyah et al., 2016). In addition to being applied on the basis of consideration of these problems, 
it is also faced with the problem of economic inefficiency and government budget allocation, the 
occurrence of disparities in input prices (fertilizer and seeds) and the consequences of derivatives and 
the creation of false competitiveness due to the use of subsidized inputs (Zulkifli et al., 2014), so that 
the protection value of the policy needs to be analyzed, subsidy Input (fertilizer and seeds) on rice 
farming in Indonesia. 
 
ANALYTICAL METHOD  
This research uses quantitative methods with Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM) developed (Mobasser et al., 
2012) used to analyze the effects of the policy of subsidizing agricultural inputs (fertilizer and seeds) 
on production so that the protection policy of subsidies is obtained, the effectiveness of the subsidy 
policy to inputs and outputs. 
The operational limits and assumptions used in the Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM) are as follows 
(Rum, 2010; Kurniawan, 2011): 
(1) Private or market prices are prices that farmers or producers actually receive and there are 
government policies in them 
(2) The price of the shadow is the price in the perfect competitive market that represents the true 
cost of social balance. In tradable commodities, shadow prices are prices that occur in 
international markets 
(3) Inputs are separated into tradable inputs and domestic resources or non-tradable inputs 
(4) Tradable inputs are production inputs that can be traded internationally (such as chemical 
fertilizers and fuels) 
(5) Non-tradable inputs or domestic factors are production inputs that are not traded on 
international markets (such as labor, land, capital) 
(6) Physical output is rice agricultural production, in this case dry milled grain with a conversion 
to rice of 65 percent 
(7) The private price of input is the actual price or market price of the production input paid by 
rice farmers 
(8) The price of domestic factors is the price of non-tradable inputs paid by rice farmers based on 
the prices prevailing in the domestic market. 
The assumption means that at the prices of commodity inputs and outputs analyzed there are 
disturbances in the form of regulations or restrictions from the government or failure, so that the prices 
that occur do not reflect the real or the value of scarcity. The output produced is traded goods (traded 
goods), which is a commodity whose price is determined by its import or export. Inputs used in the 
commodity system process consist of non-tradable domestic resources (tradable inputs) and tradable 
input factors. Non-tradable domestic factors are production inputs whose prices are determined by 
the domestic market. Non-tradable inputs are land, labor, capital and seeds. Besides that there are no 
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negative and positive impacts on others who are not directly involved in the commodity system being 
analyzed (Siregar, 2016). In detail the resulting PAM table is presented in the table: 
 
Table 3. Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM) 
Description Revenue 
Input 
Profit 
Tradable Non-tradable 
Privat (Market) A B C D 
Social (Shadow) E F G H 
Divergence 
Effect 
I J K L 
 
Description: 
 Private Profit (Market Price) (D) = A-(B+C)  
 Social Profit (Shadow Price)(H) = E-(F+G)  
 Private Cost Ratio (PCR) = C/(A-B) 
 Domestic Resource Cost Ratio (DRCR) = G/(EF)  
 Nominal Protection Coefficient on Output (NPCO) = A/E 
 Nominal Protection Coefficient on Input (NPCI) = B/F  
 Effective Protection Coefficient (EPC) = (AB)/(E-F)  
 Profitability Coefficient (PC) = D/H  
 
RESULT 
The results of the research are based on determining the private price (market) and social price 
(shadow), then the Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM) table can be prepared as follows: 
 
Table 4. Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM) 
Description Revenue 
Input 
Profit 
Tradable Non-tradable 
Privat 625291114968.00 747810482.37 74459928128.90 550083376356.73 
Social 382781030463.94 1849103946.03 102995002868.47 277936923649.44 
Divergence 242510084504.06 -1101293463.66 -28535074739.57 272146452707.29 
Source: Data Processed 
 
Table 5. Results for the Policy Analysis Matrix Table Are as Follows 
Private Profit (D)  A-(B+C)  > 0  550083376356.73 
Social profit (H)  E-(F+G)  > 0  277936923649.44 
Profitability Coefficient (PC)  D/H  > 0  1.98 
Nominal Protection Coefficien on Input (NPCI)  B/F  >1  0.40 
Nominal Protection Coefficient on Output (NPCO)  A/E  >1  1.63 
Effective Protection Coefficient (EPC)  (A-B)/(E-F)  >1  1.64 
Private Cost Ratio (PCR)  C/(A-B)  <1  0.12 
Domestik Resource Cost Ratio (DRCR)  G/(E-F)  <1  0.27 
 
DISCUSSION 
From the results of the analysis it is known that: 
(1) Advantages of Financial / Private Profit (D) amounting to 550083376356,73 because D> 0, it 
means that the commodity system gains profits at the price of the private price (market price), 
with a profit of around 5,5 million rupiah per hectare. 
(2) Economic profit / social profit (H) is 277936923649,44 because H> 0, it means that the 
commodity system benefits from costs at social prices (shadow Price), with a profit rate of 
around 2,8 million rupiah per hectare. 
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(3) Profitability Coefficient (PC) is 1,98 because PC> 0, it means that overall government policy 
provides incentives to know the profits to producers (farmers), about 98 percent of the social 
price or around 2,7 million rupiah higher than the social price or government subsidies that 
enter the rice farming sector in Indonesia are able to help increase farmers profits by 2,7 
million rupiah per hectare from the unfortunate price. The divergence of large profits between 
private and social prices (98 percent), allows the government to reduce subsidy injections that 
enter the rice farming sector so that this sector will be able to enter the international market, 
but what remains is the question of whether large profit divergences (among others due to 
subsidies) are enjoyed by farmers or other parties outside the farmer, further studies or 
research are needed to solve the problem. 
(4) Nominal Protection Coefficients on Input (NPCI) is 0,40 because the policy is protective against 
input if the NPCI value> 1, it means that government policy is not protective against tradable 
inputs or subsidy input policies on rice farming provided by the government is not effective in 
maintaining the system is able to produce with the use of tradable inputs at a social price level 
(shadow), because the use of tradable inputs at market prices is 40 percent lower than their 
social prices, thus reducing or eliminating tradable input subsidies (tradable input prices will 
rise) may increase produce with the use of tradable inputs at the level of social prices 
(producers spend costs for tradable inputs that are equal or close to their social prices). 
(5) Nominal Protection Coefficient on Output (NPCO) is 1,63 because the policy is protective 
against output if the value of NPCO> 1, then it can mean that government policy is protective 
against output (the government's rice price control policy effectively controls domestic rice 
prices) or government policy able to maintain the price of agricultural production output of 
domestic rice at a rate of 63 percent higher than social prices (shadow) or producers (farmers) 
get 63 percent higher profit than social prices, but result in the output of agricultural 
production of rice plants in general unable to compete with international prices (cheaper), this 
is not a problem if the Value Protection Analysis 50 of Indonesia's rice crop production output 
is only intended to meet domestic food consumption needs but if production is also prepared 
to meet market needs world, a number of regulators are needed ation, realignment of the 
agricultural system, strengthening of agricultural technology and adequate institutional 
support as a whole until production output prices are able to approach world market prices 
and whether the magnitude of the benefits of government domestic rice price control policies 
is enjoyed by farmers or other related parties. 
(6) Effective Protection Coefficient (EPC) is 1,64 because the policy is simultaneously protective if 
the EPC value> 1, it means that government policies are simultaneously protective (input and 
output side policies together) on production capability, or producers ( farmers) benefit from 
government policies on the input and output side together so that they are still able to 
continue to produce economically at private prices (markets), with a profit rate of 64 percent 
higher than the level of profit based on social prices, therefore the combination Input and 
output policies can be more effective in protecting rice farming systems in Indonesia, good 
coordination between institutions that are closely linked to rice farming systems is absolutely 
necessary to reduce inter-institutional policy distortions. 
(7) Competitive advantage is measured by the Private Cost Ratio (PCR) of 0,12 because the system 
is competitive if PCR <1, meaning that the system of rice crop commodities has a competitive 
advantage on private prices (market) for domestic resource use, or at market prices the 
proportion of the use of domestic resource inputs (non-tradable) is around 88 percent greater 
than tradable inputs of around 12 percent, so that apart from natural factors and global climate 
change (global climate change) as a restriction, rice farming systems are still profitable to be 
cultivated and made as a buffer of national food security with improvements to the trading 
system and a set of regulations to maintain output prices at a reliable level for consumers and 
producers (farmers). Study or research is needed to find out the right trading system and the 
form of composition of government regulations that are able to maintain rice prices at a 
reliable level for consumers and producers (farmers) in the country. 
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(8) Comparative advantage is measured by the value of Domestic Resource Cost Ratio (DRCR) that 
is equal to 0.27 because the system has a comparative advantage if DRCR <1, means that the 
system of rice crop commodities has a comparative advantage on social prices (shadow) on 
domestic resource use, or in social prices the proportion of the use of domestic resource inputs 
(non-tradable) is about 73 percent greater than tradable inputs of around 27 percent (rice 
farming systems supported by high domestic resource use or a very solid system in the use of 
domestic resources). The policy of restricting or prohibiting rice imports is still needed because 
the entry of imported rice will distort domestic rice prices, if the domestic price of rice falls to 
the level of its social price (shadow) because of the abundance of imported rice, the system of 
agricultural commodities of rice has no comparative (Zulkarnain and Kasymir, 2010), 
advantage. Studies or research on the impact of imported rice on domestic rice prices and rice 
farming systems are needed to maintain the accuracy of every government policy that is 
directly related to national rice problems. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Value of Protection of Indonesian Rice Crop Policy based on Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM) explains 
that: 
(1) The government policy is not protective against tradable input or input subsidy policy on rice 
farming provided by the government is not effective in maintaining rice farming systems to be 
able to produce with the use of tradable inputs at the level of social prices (shadow) because 
the market price of tradable inputs is 40 percent lower than social price. 
(2) The government policy is protective against output (government rice price control policies 
effectively control domestic rice prices) or government policies are able to maintain the price 
of agricultural production output in domestic rice plants at a rate of 63 percent higher than 
social prices (shadow) or producers (farmers) get the profit is 63 percent higher than the social 
price (shadow), this condition causes the agricultural production output of rice plants in 
general cannot compete with international prices (cheaper), this is not a problem if the output 
of Indonesian rice crop production is only intended to meet the needs domestic food 
consumption but if the production is also prepared to meet the needs of the world market 
(export orientation) the resulting price level is not competitive. 
(3) The government policies are simultaneously protective (input and output side policies 
together) on production capability, producers (farmers) benefit from government policies on 
the input and output side together so that they are still able to continue to produce 
economically at private prices (market), with a profit rate of 64 percent higher than the rate of 
profit on the basis of social prices. 
Suggestions for further research are as follows: 
(1) Reduction or elimination of tradable input subsidies (tradable input prices will rise) can 
increase production capability with the use of tradable inputs at the level of social prices 
(producers spend costs for tradable inputs that are the same or close to their social prices), in 
fact farmers are used to buying fertilizers and seeds at non-subsidized price level. 
(2) If Indonesia's rice production is prepared to meet the needs of the world market (export 
orientation), a number of regulations are needed, realignment of the agricultural system, 
strengthening of agricultural technology and the support of an adequate institutional system 
as a whole so that production output prices are able to approach world market prices and 
whether the benefits due to policy controlling government domestic rice prices enjoyed by 
farmers or other related parties, more in-depth study or research is needed. 
(3) The combination of input and output policies (synergistic) can be more effective and efficient 
to protect rice farming systems in Indonesia, good coordination between institutions that are 
closely related to rice farming systems in Indonesia is absolutely necessary to reduce inter-
institutional policy distortions (reducing the risk of collisions policy at the implementation 
stage). 
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